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Subnational
Market-Oriented
Debt Regimes: Empowering the
Developing World to Construct
Infrastructure
ABSTRACT

Globally, as national governments continue to decentralize
fiscal and governmental responsibility, the sound facilitation of
subnational debt markets will play a critical role in the
construction of infrastructure. However, sparse scholarship
exploring the optimal legal and financial frameworks for
encouraging the construction of infrastructure at the
subnationallevel has left a number of open questions. This Note
primarily provides a basic overview of subnational debt trends
and policies. It first reviews subnational debt regimes,
comparing market-oriented regimes with regimes with varying
levels of involvement by central governments. Though not
always possible, the Note concludes that market-driven
incentives generally produce the best subnational debt regimes.
Though it has faced some struggles historically, as the largest
and most liquid subnational debt market in the world, the
United States' municipal bond framework can provide a useful
model. The Note then presents a market-oriented proposal for
U.S. policy makers. By extending tax-exempt status to the public
debt instruments of select subnational entities abroad, the
United States could provide a promising investment opportunity
for U.S. financial institutions and citizens, facilitate the
construction of infrastructure in some of the most desperate
areas of the world, and encourage sound international
municipal finance practices through the extension of a largely
self-regulated system. This market-enabling tax exemption could
prove to be far more effective than any sort of direct spending.
Finally, the Note argues that a fluid and competitive
subnational debt market in developing countries is in the best
interest of both investors and humanitariansalike.
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MARKET-ORIENTED SUBNA TIONAL DEBT REGIMES

I. INTRODUCTION

The world's population is not only growing,' but it is also
urbanizing at record levels. '2 In writing the foreword for the 2005
Annual Report of the Cities Alliance, Jeffrey Sachs stated that "too
many cities in the developing world are failing to thrive.... [C]ities
in low-income and middle-income countries need to draw up bold,
long-term strategies for [infrastructure] investments. '"3 As national
governments worldwide decentralize responsibility for infrastructure
investment, the burden is largely falling on subnational
governments 4 to finance and construct adequate infrastructure to
5
keep pace with their rapidly urbanizing populations.
Though, as this Note argues, a liquid, transparent, and
competitive subnational debt market that matches those with savings
to those with capital needs is crucial to building infrastructure,
especially in the developing world, the financial and regulatory
background is usually tragically absent. 6 Because there has been so
little scholarship in the area, questions remain as to what the most
efficient legal and financial frameworks are to facilitate a sound
subnational debt market. 7 However, the burdens that local
governments are facing are increasing worldwide nearly universally, 8

1.
World Population Growth, 1950-2050, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
http://www.prb.org/Educators/TeachersGuides/HumanPopulationPopulationGrowth.as
px (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
2.
Press Release, United Nations, UN Report Says Urban Population of 3
Billion Today Expected to Reach 5 Billion by 2030, U.N. Press Release POP/899 (Mar.
24, 2004).
3.
Jeffrey Sachs, Foreword to CITIES ALLIANCE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 1
(2005), availableat http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/node/585.
4.
"Subnational governments" and "municipal governments" are used
interchangeably throughout the Note to refer to local governmental bodies, principally
cities, but also referring to provincial and regional governments and in some cases local
utility providers.
5.
U.N. HABITAT, GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE 11 (2009) [hereinafter U.N.
GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE], available at http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/
listItemDetails.aspx?publicationlD=2808 ("The growth of the urban population has
created and will continue
to create
serious challenges for municipal
governments ...").
6.
See Ifzal Ali, Foreword to LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND BOND
MARKETS, at iii (Yun-Hwan Kim ed., 2003) ("The domestic capital market is a fertile
source that has not been successfully utilized for development financing [in
Asial ....
").For a discussion of the decentralization challenges developing subnational
governments are facing, see infra Part II.
7.
George E. Peterson, Banks or Bonds? Building a Municipal Credit Market,
in LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND BOND MARKETS, supra note 6, at 1, 3 ("The
frequent failure of international onlending initiatives to build sustainable local credit
markets stems in part from lack of clarity as to what elements a subnational credit
market should possess."); see examples cited infra Part V.
8.
See generally U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 14
(discussing broadly applicable trends in municipal finance).
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meaning that scholarship exploring these issues and adding
perspectives is sorely needed.
The peculiar federal structure of the U.S. government has led it
to develop one of the most decentralized and market-oriented
subnational debt regimes in the world in the form of its municipal
bond market. 9 The United States began with a largely decentralized
system.' 0 Though the U.S. subnational debt regime has endured
notable scandals and market struggles," it remains the largest
market of its kind in the world. 12 Most applicable to the world's
decentralizing governments are the peculiars of the U.S. regime that
have enabled the U.S. subnational debt market to become strong, as
the real risks in the U.S. system have historically been born by
investors and local governments rather than by the country as a
whole. 13 Though at times direct involvement by a central government
is necessary and efficient, this Note argues that the market-oriented
and decentralized U.S. model, with informational and antifraud
14
regulatory oversight, is ideal in many circumstances.
The primary way in which the U.S. federal government has
facilitated subnational borrowing without debt guarantees or direct
involvement is through an extreme "hands off" approach of merely
exempting the interest payments that state and local governments
pay on municipal debt from federal income taxation. 15 In other words,
the purchasers of state and local debt do not have to pay federal taxes
on the interest they received from their investment. 16 This taxexemption system is largely an accident of the federalist system
found in the U.S. Constitution and the expansive power given to its
states under the Tenth Amendment. 17 In fact, it was not until the
1988 Supreme Court case of South Carolina v. Baker, that it was

9.
For an excellent review of the regulatory structure and history of the U.S.
municipal bond market compiled by Paul S. Maco, the former Director of Municipal
Securities for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, see Paul S. Maco,
Building a Strong Subnational Debt Market: A Regulator's Perspective, 2 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1, 2 (2001).
10.
See id. at 8 (explaining the history of American local governments in
municipal financing); Paul E. Peterson, Who Should Do What? Divided Responsibility
in the FederalSystem, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 2005, at 6, 7 (2005) (reviewing how this
trend of decentralized financing continues into the modern era).
11.
Maco, supra note 9, at 9-10.
Id. at 2.
12.
13.
See infra Parts IV, VI (reviewing the U.S. system and offering an argument
as to ideal conditions for a subnational debt market, respectively).
14.
See infra Part VI.
15.
See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (exempting interest paid on certain state and
local bonds from federal taxation); see also infra Part IV (discussing generally the
history and context of the U.S. approach toward federal regulation of subnational debt).
16.
26 U.S.C. § 103(a).
See Maco, supra note 9, at 8-9 (discussing the federal constitutional history
17.
with regard to subnational debt in the United States).
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even considered constitutional for the federal government to tax state
and local debt.1 8 This federal anomaly has allowed state and local
governments, as well as other tax-exempt entities that the federal
government lumped into the tax-exempt category for policy reasons,
to have a much lower cost of capital than private entities with
comparable credit ratings, as evidenced by Table 1, below.
Table 1: Typical Rates on Thirty-Year Bonds for a
Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Corporation19
Credit Ratings
AAA
AA
A
BBB
Unrated

Typical Tax-Exempt
Interest Rate
5.15%
5.2%
5.3%
5.9%
6.5%-7.5%

Typical Taxable
Bond Interest Rate
8.5%
8.6%
8.75%
9.7%
10.5%-12%

As a corollary to the subnational regulatory regimes that this
Note advocates, the Note also advocates for a specific market-oriented
policy proposal for the United States. Encouraging private U.S.
investment by selectively extending the tax-exemption given to U.S.
state and local governments would not only be far more effective than
direct spending, but it would also encourage long-lasting change. 20 As
the Note argues in Part VII, such a policy could provide a promising
investment opportunity for U.S. financial institutions and citizens,
facilitate the construction of infrastructure in some of the most
desperate areas of the world, and encourage sound municipal finance
within the entities that were chosen to receive the exemption.
In advocating for open and competitive subnational markets,
Part II of this Note discusses challenges facing local governments in
modernizing cities, and Part III reviews the basics of subnational
debt finance. Part IV discusses the regulatory evolution and financial
innovations of the U.S. market. Part V then details varying categories
of subnational debt regimes and discusses the growing pains faced by
one
developing
nation,
Mexico.
Part
VI
makes
policy

18.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524-25 (1988) ("We see no
constitutional reason for treating persons who receive interest on government bonds
differently than persons who receive income from other types of contracts with the
government, and no tenable rationale for distinguishing the costs imposed on States by
a tax on state bond interest from the costs imposed by a tax on the income from any
other state contract.").
19.
ROGER L. DAvis, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS: BORROWING WITH TAX EXEMPT BONDS (2001), available at

http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/172.pdf.
20.
See infra Part VII.
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recommendations to facilitate efficient subnational financing in
transition economies. Finally, Part VII of this Note advocates for a
selective extension of the U.S. municipal bond tax exemption to
facilitate U.S. private investment in developing subnational markets.

II. DEVELOPING FINANCIAL CHALLENGES FACING THE
WORLD'S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Local governments around the world face the challenge of
keeping cities economically viable by delivering a sufficient level of
services while simultaneously keeping taxes low enough so as not to
thwart economic growth. 21 Complicating the matter is the fact that,
over the past fifty years, urban populations have been increasing at a
record pace. 22 By the year 2050, the urban population in developed
nations is expected to reach 1.07 billion people, or 86 percent of the
total population in those nations; while in the less developed nations,
urban dwellers are projected to increase to 5.3 billion people, or 67
percent of the total population. 23 Altogether, the world's urban
population is expected to grow to encompass 70 percent of the world's
population. 24 For example, Table 2 illustrates the urbanization of
India:
25
Table 2: India's Urbanization Trend

(million)

Population (%)

Growth over
Previous
Decade (%)

1981

159.5

23.3

46.1

47.0

1991

217.6

25.7

36.4

55.0

2001

285.4

27.8

31.2

60.0

Year

Urban
Population

Urban Population
to Total

Contribution
of Urban
Sector to GDP

The most alarming statistic in regard to infrastructure
investment, however, is that the urban population is expected to

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 10 ("The challenge for
21.
local governments is to keep cities economically viable by delivering a high level of
services and, at the same time, keeping taxes sufficiently low so as not to discourage
individuals and businesses from locating in their jurisdiction.").
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Hemanta K. Pradhan, India, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND BOND
MARKETS, supra note 6, at 96. The data for the table was gathered from the Indian
Ministry of Urban Development's website, INDIAN MINISTRY URB. DEV.,
http://urbanindia.nic.in (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
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triple in Africa and double in Asia by the year 2050.26 Currently, 50
percent of urban residents in Asia and Africa lack adequate water
and 60 percent lack adequate sanitation.2 7 In Latin America and the
Caribbean, 30 percent of the urban population currently lacks
adequate water and 40 percent of the urban population lacks proper
sanitation. 28 In total, an estimated 840 million people currently live
29
in city slums worldwide.
A. Fiscal Decentralizationand the Growing
Responsibilities of Local Governments
In response to the urban boom, over the last twenty years a
number of countries have increased the powers and responsibilities of
local governments. 30 The basic transfer of financial responsibilities
from central governments to local governments is called fiscal
rationales
justify
the
Several
policy
decentralization. 3 1
decentralization movement, from democratic principles of local
32
autonomy to a necessary reduction on central government spending.
As previously discussed, fiscal decentralization has a long history in
industrialized countries like the United States, while it is much
newer in developing countries. 33 Overall, more than seventy-five
countries have implemented some form of a decentralization policy
34
since 1980.
Decentralization does not just entail passing responsibilities
from a central government to a state or provincial entity, but more
often entails a further passing of responsibilities for taxing and
spending decisions from a state or provincial government to local
municipalities.3 5 City representatives generally have more knowledge
about the efficient allocation of taxing and spending dollars and are
probably able to provide services more efficiently and effectively than

26.
U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 10.
ILIAS DIRIE, MUNICIPAL FINANCE: INNOVATIVE RESOURCING FOR MUNICIPAL
27.
PREPARED
FOR
THE
AND
SERVICE
PROVISION:
REPORT
INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMONWEALTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FORUM IN COOPERATION WITH COMHABITAT 257

(2006), availableat http://www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/FilefMunicipal-Finance-Paper.pdf.
28.
29.

Id. at 258.
Demand for Housing Finance Is Strong, CIVIS NOTES SERIES: SHELTER

FINANCE FOR THE POOR (Cities Alliance, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.citiesaliance.orgca/sites/citiesalliance.org/fles/CIVIS-ApriIO3-ShelterFinanceS
ynthesis.pdf.
30.
31.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 13.
See U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 14, for a detailed

discussion of this topic.
32.
DIRIE, supra note 27, at 257.
33.
34.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 14.
Id.

35.

Id.
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their larger governmental counterparts. 36 This concept is known as
the "subsidiarity principle," which essentially holds that the provision
of services is efficient when decision-making is carried out by the
37
level of government closest to the citizens receiving the services.
The subsidiarity principle also helps account for local differences in
tastes and costs, and for management gains. 38 In such a manner,
decentralization works "to reduce large fiscal deficits among both
central and local governments by raising their efficiency in mobilizing
resources and generating revenues, and by helping promote
subregional growth and poverty reduction." 39 However, governmental
efficiency and democracy are not the only driving force behind
decentralization; in some instances it may reflect an inability of a
national government to provide for its citizens. 40 All too often, the
revenues that central or provincial governments provide to
municipalities are often not enough to match the increased level of
41
responsibility that municipalities face in decentralizing regimes.

III. SUBNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND DEBT MARKETS

Effective operational budgeting and debt management are the
cornerstones that enable sound infrastructure investment. 42 Rhetoric
and politics may affect many things, but they cannot change the
principles of prudent financial management.
A. The Importance of Sound Municipal Money Management Principles
Because of the urban boom and the broad trend of
decentralization, local finance has grown increasingly in importance.
Already in some countries, local government expenditures account for
as much as half of all public spending. 43 This number is even higher
in the infrastructure context because local investments in developed
countries often far exceed those of the central government. 44 For
example, a recent survey by the United Nations found that almost all
European countries' local investments exceeded that of the selected

36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 17; see also Robert M. Bird, Setting the Stage: Municipal Financeand

Intergovernmental Finance, in THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN GOVERNMENT: POLICIES AND

PRACTICES 113, 114-15 (Mila Freire & Richard Stren eds., 2001) (arguing that central
governments must give further access to local governments).
38.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 17.

39.

Ali, supra note 6, at iii.

40.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 14.

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 13.
For a discussion of this principle, see infra Part V.
Bird, supra note 37, at 114.

44.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 15.
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countries' national investments by a central government, with the
notable exception of Greece. 4 5 This trend is not just isolated to
federalist states-in France, local governments account for more than
70 percent of public investment. 46 As previously discussed, the United
Nation's Guide to Municipal Finance recommends that "with few
exceptions (such as national defense and services that involve income
redistribution), almost all public services should be provided at the
local or regional level with local policy-makers making decisions
about what services to provide, how much to provide, and who should
47
pay for them.
In the developed world, local governments generally pay for
infrastructure by borrowing the funds and then paying it back by
taxing those who use the infrastructure over a prolonged period of
time. The critical question then becomes, "Is borrowing an
appropriate and viable option for local government investment
financing in the developing world? '48 Subnational debt can, of course,
be abused and used in an unwise manner, even in developed
49
countries.
At its core, sound finance policy in a municipality is not terribly
different from that of a private corporation. 50 It entails sound
management of the local balance sheet-a forecast of future revenues
matched up against anticipated expenditures and debt. 5 1 Appropriate
accounting and auditing principles are important for measuring the
use and performance of municipal funds. 52 The consequences of
unsound financial policies are severe: "When subnational
governments follow unsustainable fiscal policy, it can jeopardize the
services they manage (but for which the central government may
have ultimate political responsibility), the safety of the financial
system, and the country's international creditworthiness and overall
macroeconomic stability. ' 53 Throughout much of the developing
world, local fiscal reforms are underway to both ensure that local

45.
Id. at 15 fig.1.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 17.
48.
DIRIE, supra note 27, at 264.
49.
For a review of over.leveraged municipalities in the United States, see
Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal FinancialCrises, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 633 (2008).
50.
Compare generally U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at
56-63 (discussing the fiscal policies of municipalities), with RICHARD A. BREALEY,
STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (9th ed.

2008) (providing background on sound corporate fiscal policy).
51.

See U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 56-57.

52.
See id. at 61-62.
53.
Steven B. Webb, Fiscal Responsibility Laws for SubnationalDiscipline:The
Latin American Experience (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3309,
2004).
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governments have a sustainable, self-generated source of revenue, as
well as a transparent accounting model to facilitate sound investment
54
decisions.
Ultimately, sound debt management does not require a
municipality to be debt-free, as that would generally mean that the
city is not growing or appropriately investing in infrastructure. 55 It is
worth emphasizing that municipalities in an appropriately regulated
regime are only allowed to borrow for capital projects, and are not
allowed to run a government on a deficit, as central governments so
often do. 56 Instead, the operating budget is generally funded by taxes,
user fees, and intergovernmental transfers. 57 Sources of other
revenue may be items such as property sales or selective sales taxes
such as those on fuel or alcohol. 58 Although efficient operational
revenue collection is not the topic of this paper, it is worth noting that
stability, predictability, accountability, and ease of administration are
vital. 59
B. What Is a Municipal InfrastructureInvestment?
Before continuing, it is important to define exactly what is meant
by "municipal infrastructure investment." Infrastructure refers to the
basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation
of a society or enterprise.6 0 "Municipal infrastructure is essential to
the economic, social, and environmental health of cities."'61 Municipal
infrastructure can be anything from an essential road or water
sewage system, to a park or a library.6 2 When a local government
decides to build municipal infrastructure, it must make a capital
expenditure. 63 "Capital expenditures generally refer to expenditures
on goods that have a useful life of more than one year. '64 Generally,
use of current operating revenues to finance capital spending is only
desirable when the benefits of the spending benefit current users. 65

54.
See, e.g., Roberto de Vera & Yun-Hwan Kim, Overview: Local Finance,
PrivateResources, and Local Credit Markets in Asia, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
AND BOND MARKETS, supra note 6, at 19, 22-32 (discussing local fiscal reforms in
Asiatic countries).
55.
See Peterson, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing Asian cities' need to access
municipal credit).
56.

See U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 65.

57.
58.
59.

See id. at 21.
Id.
See id. at 22.

60.

Infrastructure,

ONLINE

COMPACT

http://www.askoxford.com/conciseoed/infrastructure

OXFORD

ENG.

DICTIONARY,

(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).

61.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 41.

62.
63.
64.
65.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Operating expenditures are often used for more urgent needs, while
expenditures on capital projects are often considered a secondary
priority. 66 Municipalities habitually use current operating revenues
for projects with a shorter life expectancy, such as police or fire
67
equipment, or recurring expenses such as street maintenance.
Generally, municipalities borrow for nonrecurring expenditures with
long life expectancies. 68 In developed markets, capital financing is
generally used so that the municipality can later pay for capital
expenditures with the increased revenues that are a result of the
69
expenditure.
C. The Advantages, Disadvantages,and General Categories of
MunicipalBorrowing
Efficient borrowing enables local governments to synchronize the
cost and benefit of capital expenditures over time. 70 For example,
imagine a project that, if built today, will provide a benefit for the
next twenty-five years. If the funds are borrowed wisely, the benefits
of the project can pay for itself over the next twenty-five years
through repayments of the principal plus resulting interest. 71 Those
who use the facility over the next twenty-five years can help pay for
the costs through taxes and user fees. 72 This makes borrowing a more
equitable and efficient alternative than paying for a project with the
tax dollars of those who lived in a jurisdiction for the previous
twenty-five years and may or may not enjoy the benefit of the
73
taxation.
Borrowing enables a municipality to enjoy the immediate
benefits of capital improvement, which is generally not possible if a
municipality relies only on current revenues on a pay-as-you-go
basis. 74 Even the best financial plans will entail sporadic capital
expenditures, as infrastructure needs may arise in a fashion that

66.
67.
68.
69.
system).
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
See generally Maco, supra note 9 (describing the U.S. municipal bond
U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 43.

71.
See id.
72.
A toll bridge is a common example of a project that is hopefully capable of
paying for itself; tolls from the operation of the bridge can be pledged to retire the debt
that financed the bridge's construction.
73.
See Jia Kang, People's Republic of China, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
AND BOND MARKETS, supra note 6, at 59, 72 ("Bond financing is a way to meet
unexpected spending demand, in conformity with the principle of matching costs with
benefits, because some benefits will last a long time, and those who enjoy them can be
expected to pay for them through taxes.").
74.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 43.
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cannot be sufficiently planned. 75 An example of this is the
unpredictable suburban sprawl in American cities from 1900 onward;
it would have been nearly impossible for a city planner to predict
which area would grow into the latest suburban boom. 76 Borrowing
allows municipalities to avoid large tax fluctuations in spending when
an unexpected need for a capital expenditure arises. 77 In this context,
long-term borrowing spreads the cost of a capital expenditure over a
number of years and allows the simultaneous completion of projects
during periods of extreme growth. Long-term borrowing may also
reduce the real cost of projects when there is inflation in labor and
material costs without a correlative increase in technology or value. 78
As referenced above, borrowing also serves as a tool that aids in
79
emergency situations such as a sudden increase in capital needs.
The primary disadvantage of borrowing is that a municipality
using it must allocate potential revenue sources to debt payments.8 0
-Even though the cost of debt is spread out over time, a specified and
possibly significant portion of the cost can then become a fixed
obligation.81 This. can restrict fiscal flexibility to respond to
unforeseeable future events.8 2 As discussed below, unwise borrowing
can have disastrous consequences and even developed markets have
undergone periods of turmoil as a result.8 3 Ultimately, it is wellrecognized in the developed world that responsible debt financing is a
necessary component of prudent city management.8 4 Local
governments in developed nations are equipped to prudently manage
their finances because they benefit from a deep and mature debt
85
market that provides efficient and relatively cheap access to capital.

75.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing expenditures
resulting from unexpected population growth); infra note 258 and accompanying text
(discussing expenditures resulting from natural disasters).
76.
See, e.g., MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890: A HISTORY
COMMEMORATING THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF

PLANNERS 508 (1969) ("[An example of unforeseen city expenditures is that] a
particularly aggressive developer might announce plans for a big residential tract that
could 'swamp' the local school system and call for an unforeseen expansion of the
municipal sewage treatment plant and water supply.").
77.

U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 43.

78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
See infra Part V (discussing some of the consequences of unwise
borrowing).
84.
See infra Parts 1V-V (discussing this principle in the United States and
how the principle stands within the World Bank's regulatory categories).
85.
See infra Part IV (discussing the U.S. debt market).
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of
Sadly, the areas in developing nations that most need the benefits
86
regimes.
unfavorable
most
the
have
financing
advantageous
In a broad sense, beside the monopolistic model that is discussed
in Part V, developing nations may look to two market-oriented models
in which subnational governments may access capital, "the bank
lending model used in Western Europe, and the municipal bond
model used in North America."8 7 There are distinct pros and cons to
each system, and "[developing lIocal governments may start with
either model but will typically end up with both models serving
different segments of the local credit markets. 8 8 In Banks or Bonds,
Building a Municipal Credit Market, George E. Peterson highlights
some of the reason this Note is focused on bonds, given the variety of
credit options available:
There is no need to choose a single instrument as the "right" way to
handle local government credit. Many countries simultaneously use
bank lending to municipalities and local bond issuance. The policy
rationale, however, justifies emphasizing development of local bond
markets. The public monitoring and public disclosure required for
efficient bond market operation are consistent with greater
transparency for all public financial transactions. Financial sector
deregulation has eliminated the possibility of having quasi-monopoly
municipal banks draw on especially protected government allocations of
low-cost, long-term savings to finance local infrastructure. In a
competitive world, bonds have more ways to tap institutional and
household long-term savings. Even when the ultimate credit extended
to a local government continues to be a loan from a bank or other
financial institution, the financial intermediary will increasingly raise
its own capital for onlending from bond issues. That is the direction of
change for the most successful intermediation vehicles. Even Credit
Local de France, the original municipal bank, now raises the bulk of its
89
financing on the bond market.

D. Bond Market Basics: The Cornerstoneof Sound SubnationalDebt
The correlation between a robust economy and a strong public
finance structure is undeniable. The world's largest economies in
terms of GDP also have the world's largest domestic debt markets for
use in monetary control and infrastructure investment. 90 In the same
vein, as markets in places like Latin America and Asia continue to
grow as economic players, their percentage of long-term domestic

86.
Part V.A.
87.
88.
89.

See discussion of the three categories of subnational debt regimes infra
De Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 39.
Id.
Peterson, supranote 7, at 18.

See THE WORLD BANK & THE INT'L MONETARY FUND,
90.
GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS: A HANDBOOK 3 (2001) [hereinafter

DEVELOPING
DEVELOPING

GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS] (showing the composition of domestic debt markets in
several countries with high GDPs).
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bond debt in terms of GDP is growing while the percentage of high
91
interest short-term debt in terms of GDP is continuously shrinking.
On a fundamental level, bond markets link entities that have longterm financing needs with investors who are willing to place funds in
securities.9 2 A well-functioning
long-term, interest bearing
government bond market offers a wide range of opportunities for
funding the government and the private sector.9 3 Bonds usually
mature (are paid back) after a year or longer, and they carry coupons
(periodic interest payments) at specified points during the maturity of
the bond. 94 Worldwide, bond markets typically involve the same kind
of actors:
[A] number of issuers with long-term financing needs, investors with a
need to place savings or other liquid funds in interest-bearing
securities, intermediaries that bring together investors and issuers, and
an infrastructure that provides a conducive environment for securities
transactions, ensures legal title to securities and settlement of
95
transactions, and' provides price discovery information.

There is a vast amount of scholarship that addresses central
governments' need to issue bonds in an efficient market, but less
96
scholarship about the need on the subnational or state level.
Although central governments may issue bonds for many of the same
reasons that subnational entities may, 97 in actuality they often
borrow for very different reasons. "Government bonds are the
backbone of most fixed-income securities markets ....They provide a
98
benchmark yield curve and help establish the overall credit curve."
As is discussed below, a sound macroeconomic policy by a sovereign
central government is a prerequisite to a healthy subnational debt
market. 99 The principal distinction between the two, however, is that
a central government's securities market strengthens the
transmission and implementation of monetary policy,' 0 0 while

91.
See id. (showing the composition of domestic debt markets in select Latin
American and Asian countries).
92.
Id. at 2.
93.
See general discussion of bond markets supra Part III.D.
94.

DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS, supra note 90, at 2.

95.
Id. at 4.
96.
See id. at 1 (noting the need to develop national securities markets).
97.
See id. at 2-5 (discussing why central governments issue bonds). Though
central governments now rarely issue bonds for infrastructure investment as the
decentralization trend continues. See discussion supra Part H.A.
98.

DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS, supra note 90, at 3.

99.

See infra Part V (discussing the debt markets of developing countries).

100.

DEVELOPING

GOVERNMENT

BOND MARKETS,

supra note

90,

at 4 ("A

government securities market can also strengthen the transmission and
implementation of monetary policy, including the achievement of monetary targets or
inflation objectives, and can enable the use of market-based indirect monetary policy
instruments.").
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subnational debt markets are chiefly concerned with infrastructure
101
investments.
As an initial requirement, a sovereign bond market is key to the
formation of a subnational bond market. 0 2 Sovereign bonds typically
serve as the backbone of the bond market, even for corporate bonds,
because sovereign bonds are seen as being default-free, even though
this assumption was recently called into question after the financial
crises.10 3 The sovereign bond market sets the rate for yield
comparisons, although, over time, subnational entities develop their
own independent credit history.' 0 4 An ever-present challenge for local
governments in the developing world is the fact that the major rating
agencies that determine a subnational entity's creditworthiness (e.g.,
Moody's and Standard & Poor's) cap subnational credit ratings
10 5
according to those of the sovereign.
In a recent Standard & Poor's (S&P) survey of 141 subnational
governments from twenty-two European countries, only one
jurisdiction exceeded the credit rating of its sovereign entity.' 0 6 This
makes sense, as a subnational operates under the umbrella of its
sovereign's macroeconomic policies. National governments typically
have a broad range of powers granted to them by their constitutions
to have first claim over a country's resources.' 0 7 In a crisis, most
national governments are able to fulfill their external or domestic
debt obligations ahead of a local entity.' 0 8 Simply put, a sovereign is
unlikely to default on a loan obligation before a subnational entity
does. Subnational bonds can aid the development of sovereign bonds
by offering investors and savers diverse instruments in terms of risk,
term, and security structure.' 0 9 It is worth noting, however, that the

101.
Cf. MICHAEL NOEL, BUILDING SUB-NATIONAL DEBT MARKETS IN
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES, A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, POLICY
REFORM, AND ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES,
1 (2000), available at http://www-.

wds.worldbank.org/externaldefaultfWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/09/0000949
46 00052705305247/RenderedlPDF/multi-page.pdf (stating that decentralization has
caused many countries where the World Bank is active to focus on delivering local
services and improving local infrastructure).
102.

See DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS, supra note 90, at 26 ("In

general, the development of the sovereign bond market provides the foundation for the
emergence of the other components of the domestic bond market.").
103.
Id. at 26.
104.
See id. at 26-27 (describing how yield curves are derived and how
government bond markets become less important in deriving these curves as debt
markets become more sophisticated).
105.
Otaviano Canuto & Lili Liu, Subnational Debt Finance: Make It
Sustainable, in THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW: A HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 219, 225 (Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo

Giugale eds., 2010).
106.
Id. at 225-26.
107.
Id. at 225.
108.
Id.
109.
DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT BOND MARKETS, supra note 90, at 4-5.
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general principle that a subnational government's creditworthiness is
limited by that of its sovereign has been flipped on its head since the
2011 downgrade of the U.S. credit rating, as approximately thirteen
states are now rated higher than the federal government. 110 Market
conditions and a self-generated revenue stream are other important
variables, 111 and Part VI of this Note will further discuss this issue as
well as other hindrances to the development of local credit markets.

TV. SUBNATIONAL DEBT MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES
Local and state governments in the United States have used
capital markets to finance their funding needs for some two hundred
years. 112 It not only fueled the country's industrial and westward
expansion, but also helped alleviate some of the worst financial
crises. 1 3 A thriving municipal bond market is critical to the U.S.

economy-it finances schools, roads, water, and sewage of U.S.
114
communities, as well as a myriad of other public facilities.
Although many blame the current state debt crisis in the U.S. on
such practices, 115 such market correction is simply a consequence of
operating in a competitive market 1 6 and could potentially be much
worse in a more hierarchical regime. 117 There can be no argument
that the United States has been the most innovative market through
times of bust and boom. 118 What truly makes the United States
different than the other jurisdictions discussed in this Note is that
the United States has had the most pronounced federalist protections
for its subnational entities. 119 This leads to a naturally competitive

110.
See Slideshow: 13 states with AAA credit ratings, DAYTON Bus. J. (Aug. 12,
2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/news/2Ol1/08/10/slideshow-13states-with-aaa-credit.html.
111.
See infra Part VI.
112.
See Maco, supra note 9, at 9 ("In 1751, Massachusetts became the first
colony to borrow money by issuing interest-bearing transferable bonds (payable in six
months) and was soon followed by Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina.").
113.
Id. at 2.
114.
Id.
115.
For a listing of the current Forbes debt rating of all fifty states, see Jon
Bruner, Is Your State a Debt Disaster?, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/2010/O1/20/
states-debt-pensions-interactive-map.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
116.
See infra Part V.
117.
See discussion of market categories infra Part IV and discussion of the
market in Mexico infra Part V.
118.
See infra Part IV.
119.
For a general review of federalism in the United States, see Eugene Boyd,
American Federalism, 1776 to 1997: Significant Events, U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO
GER., http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/federal.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 1997).
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subnational debt market-one that can serve as an imperfect but
120
laudable example for the developing world.
However, the U.S. model is not universally applicable in every
121
way, as sometimes central government involvement is necessary.
In fact, in many instances there may be absolutely no way for a
subnational entity to be creditworthy without the backing of its
sovereign's guaranty. 122 As Yun-Hwan Kim aptly summarized,
"Country experiences and lessons in building up local government
finance show that the real issue in financing local infrastructure
projects is not choosing between bonds and banks but rather the
ability of public policy makers to create a milieu that will encourage
the private sector to build a vibrant local credit market.' 1 2 3 Though
the analysis must be highly contextualized, general principles still
have great utility.
A. Regulatory History of Subnational Debt in the United States
By examining the innovations and failures of the U.S. municipal
bond market, certain universal lessons emerge. 124 In the English
common law, the foundation for the U.S. legal system, attempts at
securities regulation can be cited as far back as 1285,125 though
securities regulation began in its modern form after the crash of the
stock market in 1929.126 The ability to issue state and local debt has
played a crucial role in the development of the United States, helping
build canals, turnpikes,
and virtually
every
subnational
infrastructure component. 12 7 The domestic subnational debt market
grew slowly after the nation's founding, and by 1825, New York state

120.
See De Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 39 ("[M]unicipal bond markets, which
thrive on the principles of 'competition,' 'public monitoring,' and 'unbundled services,'
can be accessed directly by local governments that have strong local financial
management capabilities. The US municipal bond market is the most vibrant form of
this model.").
121.
See Service Delivery, WORLD BANK,
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
publicsector/decentralizationservice.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (giving examples of
different types of traditionally governmental services and discussing the implications
of decentralizing them).
122.
Though there are a number of examples that can be cited, perhaps the most
representative language can be found in the Asian Development's Bank summation of
local government finance in Sri Lanka: "As the scope for generating local revenue is
limited, the bulk of financing for local projects and local government expenditure has
been provided by the central Government, particularly for development projects and
social services." De Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 29.
123.
Id. at 45.
124.
Paul Maco, who established and served as the first Director of the SEC's
Office of Municipal Securities, provides a fantastic review of the regulatory history of
the U.S. subnational debt market. Maco, supra note 9.
125.
Id. at 2.
126.
Id. at 3.
127.
Id. at 9.
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bonds were trading actively on the New York Stock & Exchange. 128
Strong revenue growth inspired the issuance of some $108 million in
129
state debt between 1835 and 1838 alone.
However, early growth was then followed by a period of default
as a market panic caused the European markets (on which
subnational debt was largely traded) to close.' 3 0 Mobile, Alabama,
was the first local government to default on its obligations in 1839.131
The legacy that emerged from the first period of massive U.S.
subnational default was that many state constitutions were amended
to prohibit the loan or gift of state credit to aid a private enterprise or
132
hold private stock.
The next period of defaults came in the post-Reconstruction
period and its accompanying depression. 133 The Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution invalidated all debts incurred in
aid of the Confederacy.13 4 It is estimated that while outstanding
municipal bonds totaled $850 million in 1880, bonds in default, which
were primarily railroad bonds, totaled between $100 million and $150
million. 135 Because nationalized securities laws were a distant dream,
bondholders had to rely on the common law for protection from these
massive defaults. 136 The search for redress of defaulting railroad-aid
bonds often went all the way to the Supreme Court: "During this era,
'it was not unknown for the county officials to spend their entire
tenure of office in jail for failure to obey a federal court order, or to
1 37
spend most of their time evading federal marshals.
This period of great default brought about the birth of bond
counsel, or legal counsel, tasked to give an opinion on the legality of a
bond transaction before the subnational debt was issued. 138 Bond
counsel would review the record of enabling state constitutional and
legislative frameworks that enabled the issuance of the bonds and
then give an approving opinion if everything was legal. 13 9 During the
Great Depression, local governments again entered a period of

128.

Id.

(citing THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE FIRST 200 YEARS 14

(James E. Beck ed.,1992)).
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 10.
131.

Id. (citing STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 10

(1998)).
132.
Id. (citing Mike Willatt, ConstitutionalRestrictions on Use of Public Money
and Public Credit, 38 TEX. B.J. 413, 416 (1975)).
133.
Id.
Id.
134.
135.

(1993)).
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. (citing A.M. HILLHOUSE, LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS ERAS OF DEFAULT 17

Id. (citing BANNER, supra note 130, at 201).
Id. (quoting HILLHOUSE, supra note 134, at 13)).
Id. at 11.
Id.
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default, and by 1933, over 16 percent of the municipal market was in
default. 140 Due to the legal reforms that took place during the 1800s,
however, most of those bonds that were in default were backed by the
"full faith and credit of the issuing municipalities," meaning most
bonds would eventually be honored. 141 This "full faith and credit"
guarantee ensures that even if a city or state temporarily defaults on
its bonds, the bond will eventually be repaid so long as that city or
state remains in existence.
The turmoil of the Great Depression led Congress to emphasize a
system of "full and fair disclosure" in securities regulation to reinfuse
investors With confidence, 14 2 and thus, the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 were born. 143 The acts generally required registration of
securities and certain information disclosures. 144 Because Congress
did not feel that it was appropriate to be the gatekeepers of state and
local debt under a federalist system, they largely excluded the
145
municipal market from many of the requirements of the acts.
However, the antifraud provisions of the acts did apply and now serve
as the basis of most municipal regulation. Further, the 1933 Act
established the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and
granted it regulatory authority over the market, though it was
146
initially very limited in scope.
Another famous market scandal, brought about by an infamous
group known as "bond daddies," in the 1970s eventually prompted
further reform of the municipal markets. 147 In the 1975 amendments,
Congress granted the MSRB broad rule-making and enforcement
authority over municipal securities brokers and dealers. 148 The
constitutional concerns about the oversight were largely alleviated
because the MSRB is comprised of industry insiders, making it a selfregulating body; and, consistent with most other U.S. securities laws,
its rules are focused on information disclosure and antifraud
149
regulations.
The MSRB's first and most influential rule was Broker Dealer
Rule 15c2-12. This rule requires underwriters engaging in primary
offerings of $1 million or more to distribute an issuer's statement to

140.

Id. at 12 (citing GEORGE J. MARLIN & JOE MYSAK, THE GUIDE TO

MUNICIPAL BONDS 12 (1991)).

141.
Id. (quoting MARLIN & MYSAK, supra note 140, at 12)).
142.
Id. at 3.
143.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-b (2006).
144.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 78a.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Infra Part IV; see also Maco, supra note 9, at 18.
Id.
Municipal Securities Act, Pub. L. No.94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 131 (1975).
Maco, supra note 9, at 19 (citing Municipal Securities Act).
Id. at 22.
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investors. 150 It also requires underwriters to receive assurances that
the issuer will contract to provide yearly financial information
statements to the Nationally Recognized Municipal Security
Information Repository (NRMSIR). NRMSIR was part of the
centralized municipal security information system created by the rule
under the MSRB. 15 1 The Electronic Municipal Market Access system
(EMMA) is the modern-day embodiment of NRMSIR, and has a great
deal of information ranging from a bond's legality to required
continuing financial disclosures by the issuing entity. 152 This online
repository serves as an invaluable tool to investors and fosters a
culture of online transparency.
Today, the U.S. subnational debt market is valued at over $1.5
billion and is the world's largest market for such debt. 153 Over 52,000
issuers issue over 1.5 million municipal bonds. 154 The largest holders
of bonds are institutional investors, mutual funds, money market
funds, closed-end funds, bank trusts accounts, banks, insurance
companies, and corporations. 155 Municipal securities are not traded
in a central market, but are instead traded "over the counter" by
broker dealers. 15 6 Trading data, put out by the MSRB, 157 is available
on almost immediately on EMMA. 158
Besides the work done by private credit rating agencies and
private bond insurance companies, 159 almost all of the administrative
burden of enforcing regulations in the municipal market is born by
bond counsel, who perform the important function of addressing the
valid, binding, enforceable nature and tax exempt status of today's
bond transactions in the United States. 160 Bond counsel helps provide
a defense from legal recourse for violations by ensuring that bond
issuances comply with disclosure and security regulations, and
because reasonable reliance on the opinion of bond counsel is
generally a defense for public officials. 16 1 In order to be marketable in
today's market, every bond issuance must be accompanied by a legal

150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 21.

152.

What

Is

an

Official

Statement?, MUN.

SEC.

RULEMAKING

BOARD,

http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/WhyReadOS.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
153.
Maco, supra note 9, at 6.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159.
Credit rating agencies, public disclosure of information, and private bond
insurance are listed as the primary vehicles for limiting credit risk in the United States
in a 2003 Asian Development Bank Report. De Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 40.
160.
Maco, supra note 9, at 11.
161.

NAT'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS, THE SELECTION AND EVALUATION OF BOND

COUNSEL 1 (1998), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/
SelectionEvaluationBondCounselNABL_1998_3515767.pdf.
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opinion. 16 2 Because bond counsel bears much of the administrative
burden in the U.S. system, applying the U.S. tax exemption and
municipal regulatory system to foreign bonds would entail little
transaction costs for the federal government.
B. Notable Subnational Finance Innovations in the United States
There have been two notable financial innovations in the U.S.
bond markets that can have wide implications for developing
markets: the revenue bond and bond banks.
1.

The Revenue Bond

There has been no financing structure of greater importance to
the growth of the subnational debt market in the United States than
the revenue bond.1 6 3 "Of the $226.6 billion in long-term bonds issued
in the United States in 1999, $156.4 billion were revenue bonds and
$70.2 billion were general obligation bonds" (bonds with the backing
of the "full faith and credit" of the issuing municipality). 16 4 Revenue
bonds are debt issuances in which both the principal and the interest
are paid exclusively from a project's earnings. 165 It was first born
from the "double-barreled" revenue bonds, which were backed both by
the resulting earning of a project, as well as the full faith and credit
of the issuing government. 166 The first "pure" revenue bond was
16 7
issued in West Virginia in 1885 to finance a water and gas plant.
Scholars refer to the 1921 Act of the New York and New Jersey
legislatures, which created the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, as "the most important development in the history of the
revenue bond."' 6 The New York and New Jersey Port Authority were
independent entities and had the power to finance multiple
projects. 169 "By the 1950s, almost every state had enabling legislation
17 0
for revenue bond financing."'
Today, there are three types of revenue bonds commonly
employed worldwide: standalone enterprises, supplement-supported
71
enterprises, and government guaranteed enterprise revenue bonds.1

162.
163.

Maco, supranote 9, at 11.
Id.

164.

Id.

(2000)).
165.

Id.

166.

Id.

167.
168.
169.

Id. (citing MARLIN & MYSAK, supra note 140, at 18).
Id. (citing MARLIN & MYSAK, supra note 140, at 19).
Id.

170.

Id.

at 13 (citing THE BOND BUYER/SEC. DATA Co.,

(citing ROBERT LAMB & STEVEN RAPPAPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS 15

(1980)).
171.

2000 YEARBOOK 5

Id. at 14.
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If a project or enterprise cannot collect sufficient revenues to cover
the costs of construction and operations and repay a bond, the pure
revenue bond may be enhanced by adding a second source of
revenue. 172 This second source of revenue may be a subsidy or grant
from a local or national government 173 that is entirely independent of
enterprise bond. 174 If
supplement-supported
the project-a
circumstances do not allow for a second revenue stream, a local
government may guarantee a bond with its general obligation,
creating a "double-barreled bond. ' 175 Some local governments with a
strong credit rating may choose to offer their guarantee, despite a
project having sufficient revenue to cover the cost of debt, simply to
176
enhance the credit of the bond and lower its cost.
2.

The Bond Bank

The second major U.S. innovation that could have wide-ranging
implications for developing nations is the bond bank. One of the
principal problems that local governments with modest needs faced in
the United States was the financial disadvantage associated with the
enormous fixed cost of placing securities on a public market and only
having the high interest rates of local banks as a financing
alternative. 177 Sometimes the cost of putting a bond issuance on the
public market would exceed the cost of a bank loan. 7 8 For small,
179
first-time issuers with little credit history, this was especially true.
It was against this backdrop that bond banks were formed.
States created banks or agencies capable of pooling together the
resources of several municipalities in order to help them acquire
capital at a lower rate. 8 0 The cost savings came through economies of
scale achieved by combining the local municipalities' fixed costs of
capital, and additional savings came through the lower interest rates
that came with the diversified risk and additional credit-worthiness
not available to the small, first-time issuer.1 81 Today, bond banks
issue their own debt securities and then re-loan the proceeds to

172.
Id.
173.
Though a national government should never guarantee a subnational bond,
see discussion infra Part V.
174.
Maco, supra note 9, at 14.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 15.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.

Id.
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municipalities with smaller needs.18 2 Local governments can then
18 3
negotiate their debt needs directly with the bond banks.
Table 3, below, evidences the partial results of a survey of
seventeen government finance leaders as to the greatest advantages
of using a bond bank.
Table 3: Survey of Seventeen Government Finance
184
Officers on the Benefits of Bond Bank Issuance
Not Mentioned
or in Bottom 3

Average
Ranking

Mentioned in
Top 3 Reasons

Lower Interest Cost

1.2

16

0

Lower Issuance Cost

2.9

15

0

Improved Market
Access

3.4

9

0

Borrower Too Small

4.9

5

3

7.4

8

1

7.5

1

6

8.4

1

16

Reason

Reasons

for Direct Sale

Administrative
Burden Less

No Credit Rating
Required

Lessens Disclosure
Burdens

There are two primary disadvantages to utilizing bond banks: a
lack of flexibility by the borrower in selecting financing teams and
consultants, and that borrowers with good credit ratings may be
better off issuing bonds on their own right.18 5 However, overall they
are a valuable tool that assist governmental entities in accessing
capital markets.

V. SUBNATIONAL BORROWING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

As noted in the introduction, an operative question is whether
"[subnational] borrowing [is] an appropriate and viable option for
86
local government investment financing in the developing world?"'
As noted in Part II, the developing world faces numerous challenges

182.
183.

Id.
Id.

184.
De Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 42 (quoting GOVT FIN. GRP., INC., AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE BOND BANKS (1997), available at http://www.cifanet.org/newsPDF/

bb97report.pdf).
185.
Id. at 42-43.
186. DIRIE, supra note 27, at 264.
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in forming an efficient subnational debt market.' 8 7 Yet, in 1996, an
urban authority in India became the first entity of its kind to prove
that such subnational debt markets are possible.' 8 8 The Indian urban
authority requested and received a credit rating and issued a bond for
water and sewage projects. 189 The effort began two years earlier,
when the urban authority launched a major effort, in partnership
with the United States Agency of International Development
(USAID), to improve the transparency and efficiency of its revenue
expenditure and tax collection processes.' 90 This focus on fiscal
responsibility within the city eventually enabled it to make the bond
issue and infrastructure investment, bringing clean water and
sanitation to its inhabitants. 191 In a much broader sense, India has
made astounding progress in facilitating a municipal credit market,
which should lend hope to other developing countries. 192 In short,
subnational governments can use responsible debt financing to their
advantage, but the reforms necessary to facilitate optimal borrowing
193
conditions may take work and time.
A. The Spectrum of Broad Control Regimes for
Subnational Debt Markets
World Bank scholarship generally divides the differing
subnational debt regimes into one of three categories: (1) monopolistic
subnational debt markets, (2) competitive subnational debt markets,
and (3) mixed subnational debt markets. 194 It is important to analyze
each regime within the framework of both financial and agency
rationales. Each regime has a set of well-documented strengths and
weaknesses, and there are many useful case studies.
1.

Monopolistic Subnational Debt Markets

At the furthest end of the regulatory spectrum are countries with
monopolistic subnational debt markets. In a mohopolistic market, the
central government is the sole principal and effectively combines the

187.
188.

See supra Part II.
DIRIE, supra note 27, at 264.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
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See generally LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND BOND MARKETS, supra

note 6 (discussing the progress of Asian countries in developing municipal credit
markets).
193.
DIRIE, supra note 27, at 264; see also de Vera & Kim, supra note 54, at 43
(discussing the reality that lasting reforms are incremental rather than dramatic).
194.
Noel, supra note 101, at 3.
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functions of capital grant allocations and lending amongst its
195
subnational entities.
There are a number of problems which are inherent in
monopolistic regimes. The first is that monopolistic regimes often
exercise poor oversight over funds after they are disbursed,
presenting classic moral hazard and agency problems. Another set of
problems that may arise are ex post efficiency risks, which are a
product of the lack of incentives that subnational entities have to
deliver their best good faith efforts to undertake projects without the
threat of non-refinancing. 196 Additionally, there is an ex ante
allocation risk, which entails the danger of a central government
inefficiently allocating resources due to political pressures or other
197
influences.
In this same vein, there are several other nonmonetary costs
associated with a monopolistic system. Chief among these is the local
government's loss of control and autonomy over its borrowing and
investment decisions. 198 This violates the heart of the subsidiarity
principle. 199 Additionally, there is danger that the central
government will not be able to match the needs of municipalities in
terms of speed, volume, expertise, and flexibility. 200 Monopolistic
systems divorce domestic savers and local governments and remove
the efficiencies of market pricing mechanisms. 20 1 In monopolistic
regimes, the central government must bear the credit risks of all of
20 2
its municipalities.
The example of the potential detriments of a monopolistic regime
can be seen in Latvia, a country that chose to revert to a centralized
system of credit allocation to municipalities after a market based
regime began to emerge. 20 3 Until the latter part of the 1990s, local
governments in Latvia had wide powers to borrow from either
domestic or foreign sources under a regulatory system that supported
transparent and efficient borrowing. 20 4 There were no reported cases
of defaults or related municipal finance litigations. 20 5 However, in
1997, the country effectively banned commercial borrowing from
domestic banks due to a pervasive political attitude that distrusted
banks and was inclined toward direct control by the central
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government over local government finances. 20 6 Now, the Latvian
subnational debt market is suffering from many of the problems
associated with monopolistic systems. 20 7 Like many other central
government regimes, the Latvian approach "does not involve a
commercial assessment of credit risks, relies on its right to intercept
transfers to local governments in case of payment default, and
208
devotes limited time and human resources to loan applications.
The Latvian government may be correct in recognizing that a private
system would be too much for the limited financial management
capacities of its municipalities. 20 9 However, the inefficiencies
associated with a monopolistic system may be enough to overcome
such fears.
In the 1980s, Australia prohibited subnational governments from
accessing capital markets and exerted direct control over all
subnational loans by requiring them to go through a "Loan
Council. '210 This direct control system was not effective, and
subnational governments are now free to access capital markets
2 11
directly.
2.

Mixed Subnational Debt Markets

Mixed debt markets present varying degrees of state control and
private financing. They generally present varying channels of finance
from central government, state-owned financial intermediaries,
private financial intermediaries and investors, and state-owned
agencies within the central government. 212 Multiple avenues for
funding present numerous agency, moral-hazard, and accountability
problems. 213 Foremost among these problems are implicit or explicit
sovereign guarantees of municipal debt. 214 As discussed at length
throughout this Note, such guarantees can encourage poor fiscal
management on the part of subnational governments. 215 Additional
agency problems arise where state-owned financial intermediaries

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
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are protected by regulatory provisions, resulting in a non-level
playing field for private lenders in the market. 216 As is discussed in
detail in Part V, the effectiveness of a regulatory regime is often
217
dependent on the regime's reliance on market discipline.
3.

Competitive Subnational Debt Markets

In a fully competitive market, the central government creates no
implicit or explicit guarantee on subnational debt. 218 The central
government and private financial intermediaries compete on a level
playing field for subnational lending business. 219 This decentralized
system lessens agency problems and moral hazards by making the
threat of non-refinance, or the potential denial of lending, more
tangible. 220 Although there are currently no developing markets that
employ a competitive subnational debt market structure, France
provides an example of a country that switched from a mixed market
to a fully competitive regime. 221 Over recent modern history, the
French government adopted a simple and transparent method of
capital allocation amongst its subnational entities. 222 Municipalities
now do not have to get their loans preapproved by the central
government and may borrow from domestic or international
sources. 223 However, open and competitive does not mean "rulefree,"224 and the French keep several checks in place ensuring that
budgets are balanced and that local governments are not using debt
22 5
to pay for other debt, much like in the United States.
While reliance on market discipline is certainly the most
desirable system, it cannot be immediately implemented in every
jurisdiction for a number of reasons. The first is that a reliance on a
financial market that may not be entirely free or open may not
produce optimal results. 226 Liquidity is a prerequisite to an efficient

216.
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217.
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soundness of the market.").
218.
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219.
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220.
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market.2 27 Second, if transparent plans of accounting are not readily
available, then a uniform credit assessment is not possible. 228 Some
sort of standardized system must be in place for credit agencies to be
able to compare apples to apples. Further, local governments may not
be incentivized to act with care if there is any form of de facto
guarantee that a sovereign government will bail out the
229
municipality.
Even in Canada, a highly developed economy that relied on
market discipline and private rating companies to evaluate
subnational debt, Canadian provinces did not act with financial
prudence. 23 0 By the mid-1990s subnational debt had reached 23
percent of GDP. 23 1 When Brazil switched to an open, competitive
subnational debt market in the 1970s, subnational debt rose from 1
percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 20 percent in the mid-1990s,
causing the federal government to issue three bailouts. 232 The
inherent risk of relying on market discipline is that some actors will
not fear market consequences. Central governments must draw a
hardline, no-bailout policy to maintain the integrity of the market. As
Winston Churchill once said in a broader context: "The inherent vice
of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue
of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries." 233 When subnational
governments follow irresponsible fiscal policy, these governments can
jeopardize not only their own services, but also the safety of the
stability. 234
system and macroeconomic
financial
country's
Notwithstanding the failures of market discipline, one could argue
that the risks lie with those who take them. Central governments
must continue to wrestle with the right balance between preventing
bailouts and letting market forces play out, even if this comes at a
social and economic cost to subnational governments.

B. GrowingPains in Mexico
An example of a developing country's growing pains with
subnational fiscal management is that of Mexico, a country that has
been locked in a struggle for sustainable subnational financial

227.
For a detailed background on the concept of liquidity in markets, see
generally Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43
J. FIN. 617 (1988).
Giugale et al., supra note 210, at 252.
228.
229.
See id. at 253 (arguing that sovereign bailouts in a mixed system creates
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230.
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233.
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234.
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policies. 235 In Mexico's recent past, subnational governments could
solely borrow from development and commercial banks, as explained
below, and could rarely issue bonds. 23 6 The borrowing ability of state
and local governments is regulated by the Mexican Constitution,
which requires that subnational governments borrow only in pesos,
only from Mexicans, and only for productive investments. 237 As often
happens with government regulations, financial institutions found a
way around the requirements by founding government development
banks that take money from foreign investors and then lend to
subnational entities in pesos, thus satisfying the "protections" of the
238
Mexican Constitution.
Most limiting was that the main source of revenue for
subnational governments came from a mandatory federal transfer of
funds. 239 These transfers accounted for about 85 percent of
municipalities' income. 240 Prior to reform in 1997, these transfer
241
payments could be used as collateral to secure subnational debt.
One of the side-effects of the mandatory transfer was then an implicit
sovereign guarantee for local debt. 242 This legislative scheme had two
implications for the behavior of suppliers and debtors: "First, banks
had incentives to make loans to subnational borrowers, because the
credit risk was virtually nil, being guaranteed by the federal
government. Second, states had incentives to borrow because the
federal government would always bail them out. '24 3 Until reform was
passed in 1999, lending institutions rarely even conducted credit
244
evaluations because lending was virtually risk free.
In 1997, the Mexican government amended its Constitution to
restrict banks from corresponding with the Treasury Department to
automatically withdraw the funds from the federal transfers. 24 5 In
essence, subnational governments then had to arrange their own
payment plans with banks. 246 This was designed to force subnational
governments to regulate themselves and reduce the likelihood of a
bailout as the federal government was removed from the market.
Unfortunately, the reform stymied banks' willingness to lend to
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subnational entities, forcing the Mexican Congress to once again pass
2 47
an effectual guarantee by the central government.
Finally, in 2000, pervasive market-oriented reforms were
enacted. 248 Though the reforms are much lauded and are generally
perceived by the financial community as getting Mexico back on track
to fiscal responsibility, 249 it is too soon to gauge the reforms' effect on
2 51
the market. 250 However, the reaction thus far has been positive,
with cautious optimism as to how creditors in the market will
2 52
interact with the states' new autonomy.

VI. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES OF SOUND SUBNATIONAL FINANCE

As discussed above, many issues presented in municipal finance
253
differentiate it from those of, for example, corporate finance.
However, the principles of sound financial management should be
true across the public and private sectors. Politics in local
governments should not serve as an excuse to refuse to abide by the
same principles of finance that govern the private sector. That is not
to say that political considerations do not play a large role in the
financial decisions of subnational entities, 254 but instead that political
considerations should not take precedence over sound financial
reasoning. Although perhaps more pronounced in the public sector,
agency problems are also replete in corporate finance. 255 The biggest
difference between public and corporate finance is that corporations
have more immediate consequences for poor fiscal decisions and real
rewards for sound fiscal management. In the public finance world,
the carrots and sticks are measured by only one real metric: votes. In
the private sector, there is usually no parent company to pay an

247.
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insolvent's debts when the situation becomes too dire. The same
should hold true in public finance. Sound subnational debt regulation
should help to align public sector and nonprofit policies to be
congruent with private sector realities. For the purposes of the
present analysis, subnational debt regulation can be divided into
three categories: (1) regulations by national governments, (2) internal
fiscal policy within subnational entities, and (3) the relationship
between subnational governments and their lenders.
A. National Regulation
At the national level, a central government should do everything
it can to facilitate a competitive subnational debt market. 256 Market
discipline is consistent and is arguably less susceptible to public
pressure. 257 Though not always possible, at the heart of a competitive
market is a central government's absolute per se refusal to guarantee
subnational debt, absent a force majeure.258 In a competitive market,
the national government should not put itself in the position of
universal auditor. Securities laws in the United States can serve as
an important point of comparison, which, as discussed, are centered
259
on disclosure and antifraud protections.
Sound central government policies that rely on market discipline
are necessary. Such policies motivate fiscal sustainability and
discourage irresponsible subnational entities from free-riding on the
260
sound fiscal management of other governments in its jurisdiction.
Mexico's subnational regulation, as discussed above, provides an
example of what can go wrong when there is even an implicit
sovereign guarantee of a subnational's debt. 261 Detractors will be
quick to point out that many developing countries do not have the
autonomy or expertise to properly function in a market-oriented
system. 262 However, fiscal positions can be changed once sound policy
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is enacted at the subnational level.26 3 While top-down control over
subnational finances through mechanisms like debt ceilings and
budgetary discipline may be appropriate for a time, the end goal
264
should always be to reach a system of complete market discipline.
265
As is the case in France,
reliance on market discipline does
not mean that there should be a complete absence of rules.2 66 Having
267
basic securities disclosure requirements, as in the United States,
can reduce fraud and increase investor confidence. Regulations
designed to decrease fraud could also only increase true competition.
National governments should create a centralized informational
depository, similar to the NRMSIR in the United States. Having a
centralized information system that includes the financial data of
subnational entities should lead to a more transparent and
informationally efficient market. Generally, the following information
should be disclosed upon the subnational issuance of a debt
instrument: (1) the interest rate or, if the interest rate is variable, the
manner in which such rate is determined; (2) the timing and manner
of payment of the interest on and the principal of the bonds; (3) the
minimum denomination in which the bonds may be sold; (4) whether
the bonds can be redeemed by the issuer prior to maturity and, if so,
on what terms; (5) whether the investor has the right to require the
issuer to repurchase the bonds at face value; (6) the sources from
which the issuer has promised to make payment on the bonds (e.g.,
from its general taxing power, from a specific tax or revenue source,
etc.); (7) whether any bond insurance, letter of credit, or other
guarantees have been provided for repayment; (8) the consequences of
a payment or nonpayment default by the issuer; (9) current financial
and operating data; (10) revenue bond, additional financial and
operating information (e.g., feasibility studies, engineering reports);
2 68
and (11) a legal opinion approving the legality of the bond.
Finally, subnational debt markets are just as susceptible to
fraud as any other market. A regulatory body, similar to the MSRB,
is needed to ensure that actors within the market play fair. Such an
organization would be responsible for promulgating relevant
informational requirements, antifraud provisions, and keeping
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possible "pay to play" and other political corruptions out of the
market.
B. Sound Internal Fiscal Policies Within Subnational
Entities and Debt Instruments
One of the consequences of operating in an open, competitive
market is that governments are free to make either positive or
detrimental fiscal decisions. In the discussed example of the Indian
municipality that successfully issued a bond to build a water
system, 26 9 efforts to raise the capital began with the implementation
of sound internal policy. 270 Taxing and operational spending decisions
are outside of the discussion of this Note, and there is already much
scholarship on the topic. 271 Once a consistent and principled
operational budget is in place, many municipalities may still not be
viewed as creditworthy. It is crucial that developing countries take
advantage of two U.S. innovations: bond banks and revenue bonds.
Bond banks may play an important role in the credit building
process of the developing world. As was previously discussed, bond
banks can pool the credit of several subnational entities to lower
default risk. 272 It may be best to organize such entities at the state or
provincial level, as was done in the United States. In emerging
markets, policy makers should give particular attention to the entry
requirements of bond banks to avoid free-rider problems.
Standardized requirements should be developed ex ante to avoid the
potential for political manipulation.
Subnational entities in emerging markets should heavily
consider using revenue bonds as discussed in Part IV, if the vehicle is
available. 273 Considering the need for revenue-generating projects,
such as water treatment in emerging markets, 2 74 there are certainly
a number of eligible projects. Exclusively dedicating the revenue from
the resulting public works project to the bonds' coupon and principal
repayment should additionally help aid credit-worthiness and lower
interest rates. As discussed in Part IV, additional guarantees should
also factor into the analysis, such as a dedicated tax contribution or
"a full faith and credit" clause. 275

269.
See supraPart IV.
270.
See supra Part IV.
271.
See, e.g., U.N. GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL FINANCE, supra note 5.
272.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
273.
See supraPart IV.B.1.
274.
See
Statistics
of
the
Water
Crisis,
WATER
PROJECT,
http://thewaterproject.org/water stats.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (detailing the
problem of worldwide sanitation and water shortage).
275.
See supraPart IV.B. 1.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45-'917

C. The Borrower-LenderRelationship in Case of Default
In addition to information disclosures as discussed in Part V.A, it
is also important to establish ordering, in case of default. Steven
Schwarcz thoroughly addressed the topic in Global Decentralization
and the SubnationalDebt Problem.276 Just as market discipline must
be used to impose private sector-like discipline on subnational
entities ex ante, a bankruptcy regime somewhat analogous to the
private sector should be used ex post upon default. Schwarcz
explains:
The genius of bankruptcy reorganization law is that it provides
incentives for debtors and their creditors, notwithstanding their
disparate interests, to reach a voluntary agreement on the terms of the
restructuring. Agreement on a plan of reorganization is rewarded;
failure to agree is penalized. As a result, most corporate restructurings
are consensual. "The basis of corporate reorganization law's efficiency
rests in the underlying theory of freedom of contract: voluntary
277
contracting maximizes value."

Schwarcz's model law278 is thus meant to model the bankruptcy
procedures that creditors have against an insolvent corporation.2 79 In
emerging markets that are sure to be replete with high return and
high risk municipal investments, such restructuring programs could
go a long way toward improving creditors' collections upon default.
The services that local governments provide are too important to be
totally subject to events such as cyclical economic downturns.
Especially when collateralized debt obligations are at issue,
restructuring could be extremely useful not only to creditors' bottom
line, but also to the public interest.

VII. A MARKET-ORIENTED

FOREIGN AID PROPOSAL:
EXTENDING THE U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND EXEMPTION

The United States is currently undergoing a budgetary crisis
that necessitates budgetary efficiency. 28 0 At the same time,
subnational governments in developing countries lack the basic

276.
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infrastructure necessary to care for their people. 28 ' As was discussed
in Part II, there are two primary reasons why developing subnational
governments struggle to raise capital to construct infrastructure: (1)
the riskiness of potential investments make borrowing costs
astronomically high for developing cities, and (2) there is an
insufficient regulatory structure in place to provide the necessary
informational and credit-worthiness safeguards that cities in
developed countries enjoy. 28 2 Without solid financial records and a
system of information disclosure, no entity can expect to borrow
283
money at a reasonable rate.
In theory, extending the U.S. municipal bond exemption to
certain developing cities could be a win-win both for the developing
cities and the United States. Every potential developing issuer would
have to comport with the same U.S. standards and regulations that
U.S. cities must follow when issuing tax-exempt debt. This would
primarily require offering documents that list basic financial history
(such as tax revenues and expenditures), informational disclosures
detailing the nature of the project and the developing city's plan to
pay back the bonds, and an approving opinion by a U.S. bond lawyer
stating that the bonds are legal and exempt from taxation. 284 The
exemption would thus provide work for the U.S. public finance sector,
a helpful and hopefully profitable venture for U.S. investors, and
capital where it'is needed most in the world. The U.S. Federal
government would also win in that it would be able to maximize the
efficiency of its foreign aid spending by incentivizing private investors
to engage the market rather than simply pouring funds directly into a
project.
To understand the advantages that this exemption would
provide over direct spending, imagine that Ethiopia's second largest
city, Dire Dawa, needs a new water system. 28 5 In 2004, the United
States gave about $160 million in foreign aid to the country of
Ethiopia. 28 6 Although the work of organizations like WaterAid have
been extremely helpful in alleviating the sanitary water shortage in
28 7
the country, there remains serious water access issues in Ethiopia.
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Overall, access to capital is the single largest impediment keeping
Ethiopians from accessing reliable drinking water. 288 In Dire Dawa,
water coverage is only estimated to extend to about 68 percent of the
2
population. 89
Suppose the city of Dire Dawa was interested in building a new
water supply system to permanently serve its residents at a cost of $1
billion. The $160 million in foreign aid that the United States gave to
Ethiopia in 2004290 is not nearly enough to finance such a large
capital investment. Tax-exempt bonds could bridge the gap by
allowing private U.S. investors to make the capital investment that
they might not have made outside of the enabling power of the U.S.
government-an enabling that does not require the United States to
do any substantive spending. Further, Dire Dawa would have to
comport, and may be incentivized to pursue, a high standard of
financial accounting and disclosure to be eligible for the exemption.
Tax exempt bond financing is as simple as it is useful. Suppose
that Dire Dawa is ready to borrow at a rate proportional to its credit
rating with the added bonus of tax exemption. 29' The city of Dire
Dawa would work with a U.S. underwriter to prepare offering
documents for their planned water system. If the offering documents
are accurate and legal, bond counsel would write an approving
opinion stating that the bonds are a valid tax-exempt investment.
The underwriter would then sell Dire Dawa's bonds to investors who
consider the project investment worthy, and the underwriter would
then send the proceeds to the city for construction. After the project is
constructed, Dire Dawa would charge the citizens who use the water
system a fee for its use and place the proceeds available after
operating costs into a debt repayment account, which would then be
used to pay off the bonds. If the fees were not enough to service
interest payments on the bonds, then Dire Dawa would probably have
to dedicate other sources of tax revenue to the project.
Some might argue that a tax exemption is equal to spending
because it guarantees lost revenue, but such a statement does not
provide a complete picture. In a worst case scenario, imagine that the
purchasers of Dire Dawa's bonds were all in the top U.S. tax bracket
of 35 percent and that all of the gain that the investors otherwise

visited Apr. 1, 2012) (noting that in 2003 only 34 percent of the total population had
access to potable water).
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would have enjoyed had they not purchased the bonds would be taxed
as ordinary income at the 35 percent bracket (and not in the 15
percent capital gains rate) in equal proportion. If the bonds had an
interest rate of 7 percent, even in the most extreme hypothetical, the
United States is only out $70 million in lost tax revenue, or roughly
44 percent of its foreign aid budget to Ethiopia in 2004.292 However,
even this is an overly grim picture, as it is impossible to model how
much tax revenue the United States would "lose" in such a scenario
because there is no way to predict what investors would do with their
money if the Dire Dawa opportunity were not available, and if the
alternative investment would be as rewarding. If the investors
instead decide to put the money they would have invested in the
bonds of Dire Dawa under their mattress, or worse, realize a loss on
their alternative investment, then the United States would indeed
lose nothing.
Such a tax exemption enables capital markets to work, utilizing
more money from private investors and less from taxpayers. The U.S.
government would in,effect not act as a charity, but would enable the
marketplace to address some of the most serious issues in the world
today. The United States does this quite often domestically through
its § 501(c)(3) and religious organization tax policies.2 93 Some might
argue that allowing international cities the opportunity to borrow at a
tax-exempt rate would raise the borrowing costs of domestic cities,
but this Note does not propose allowing every city in the world an
exemption, as not every subnational entity in the world would be able
or desire to utilize U.S. capital. If it were implemented on a large
scale, the access to capital concern could largely be alleviated by
allowing banks to realize the full benefit of the tax exemption,
294
something they are not now allowed to do.
Most assuredly, high disclosure and financial accounting
standards, coupled with lowered borrowing costs from U.S. tax
exemptions, would not be enough to allow every struggling city in the
world to construct the infrastructure that it needs. It is not an
appropriate tool for every situation, and high standards and a tax
exemption would not prevent defaults. USAID and charitable
financial NGOs, such as the World Bank, may need to provide credit
guarantees in many cases just to make borrowing a realistic option
for some cities. This Note does not attempt to discuss potential
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See generally Paul H.K. Hageman, An Examination of Religious Tax
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religious organizations).
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banks' limited ability to enjoy the tax-exempt status of municipal securities).
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comprehensive solutions, but simply aims to present a starting point
for a much needed conversation.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In many cases, an ideal subnational debt market is open,
competitive, and transparent. Efforts should be made to enable
market discipline to be the primary carrot and stick, and a central
government agency must ensure that there is sufficient information
diffusion and antifraud protection for an efficient market to operate.
Subnational entities in emerging markets must first use operational
fiscal discipline before they can utilize the subnational debt market
effectively. The extension of the municipal bond tax exemption by the
United States to select developing entities could prove to be an
effective market enabler; and at minimum, it is an effective spending
conversation that we should be having. This Note in no way portends
to be exhaustive or definitive. However, given the proper framework,
developing subnational debt markets could potentially provide both a
promising investment arena for U.S. citizens and an important tool
for combating urban poverty.
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